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The world market for merchant ships and the world shipbuilding industry are facing serious difficulties, 
with  shipbuilding prices plwruneting and future demand likely to  remain weak  for some years. Over-
capacity in the shipbuilding industry is expected to grow in coming years, due to a combination of the 
coming on line of new facilities  (also in emerging shipbuilding nations such as  China),  the  potential 
con  version of  na  vaJ shipyards to commercial production and increased productivity. 
A competitive shipbuilding industry is important to the European Union and contributes to its economic 
and social development by  providing a substantial m&rket  for a range of industries and by  maintaining 
employment in a number of regions, many of which are already suffering a high rate of unemployment. 
Shipbuilding also employs a number of  advanced technologies for products and production and therefore 
is an important element in a developed industrial culture. 
Unfortunately  all  efforts to  create  a  sustainable environment for  EU  shipyards have  been  severely 
hampered by  the  impact of the Asian crisis, and  by  the  fact  that  the  OECD Agreement "Respecting 
Normal  Com~titive Conditions in the Commercial Shipbuilding and Repair Industry" of 21  December 
1994 did not enter into force - an Agreement which the Community ratifi\!d,  believing that it  would be 
the  best option to  enable Community shipyards to compete under fair  trading conditions.  In  particular, 
Korean yards have, mainly between  I 994 and  I 996, expanded shipbuilding capacities in  a way that is 
not justified by global market conditions, and they now need to till these surplus capacities. 
The Council Regulation (EC) No  1540/98 establishing a new set of rules for state aid  to  the sector for 
the period 1999-2003 was designed to address the global question of the future of the EU  shipbuilding 
industry in a context where, in absence of the OECD Agreement, international disciplines in this sector 
are  not  to  be expected soon.  The regulation also  requires the  European Commission to  present  to  the 
Council  a  report  on the  market  situation  and  appraise  whether  European  yards  are  affected  by  aJ:ti-
competitive practices. If it is established that anti-competitive practict:s of any kind are causing injury to 
industry,  the  Commission  is,  where  appropriate.  to  propose  to  the  Council  measures  to  address  the 
problem. 
This  report  analyses  the  current  market  situation.  especially  concerning  the  production  in  Asian 
shipyards,  and  presents  a  tirst  set  of possible  lines  of action  that  could  address  problems  from 
individual  damaging  shipbuilding  wntracts  or  non-market  business  practices  by  Far-Eastern 
competitors. It thus responds to  the request  laid down in  Cow1cil Regulation (EC) No  1540/98. As this 
report  is  the  tirst  in  this respect  and  others will  tollow,  1t  does not aim to  cover the entirety of world 
shipbuilding in all  its technological and economic aspects, but rather highlights the most important and 
recent problems and  dcvdopm~:nts, thus providing guidance for future actions. Additional measures may 
be required and would be addressed as appropriate in torth-coming reports. %.  GeoeraJ MJarket Ana.ly•b 
Demand aad Supply 
The world shipbuilding market has been in imbalance over a long period of time and all relevant Jl'UiJ"kel 
participants expect this  si~on  to persist and  even deteriorate.  The demand side in  particular is now 
widely  considered to  be  on a longer·tenn downtwn.  As can be  seen  in  Figure  1 the supply  forecasts 
continue  to  exceed  the  demand  forecasts.  Although  the  major  shipbuilders'  associations  AWES 
(Association of European Shipbuilders and Shiprepairers) and SAJ (Shipbuilders' Association of Japan) 
on the one hand, and KSA (Korean Shirbllilders' Association) on the other, see future demand and supply 
at ditlerent levels (with demand in general staying stable), and though they  also have different opinions 
regarding the volume of the resulting lack in demand, both sides agree that the gap between supply and 
demand will widen. 
The total new building capacity world-wide currently amounts to nearly 20 Mio. cgt (compensated gross 
tonnes,  a  measurement  combining  ship  size  and  shiptype-specific  building  effort).  Total  new 
shipbuilding orders were 20.935 Mio. cgt in  1997 and  18.359 Mio. cgt in  1998. For the first half of 1999 
new orders of 7.86 Mio. cgt were reported, which indicates that demand is indeed increasingly out of line 
with supply and that 1997 and 1998 were exceptional years with regard to the demand/supply ratio. 
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• Th~ data underlying the graphical repre!Klotations and the &Ource references can·be found in Annex HI. 
2 It is notab!e  that production in  1998 had  only reached the  level of 1978 after many  years of decline. 
Moreove~ 1998 was a year that saw a high nwnber of  orders and completions, partly due to an abnormal 
decrease in prices since the beginning of 1997 and a booming demand for passenger vessels as the cruise 
market continued to expand. 
;  ' 
~nder  these conditiou8 1 s~le ~  ~~tio~  are unlikely to evolve soon, unless new building capacity 
IS removed from the mlllket on a s1gmficant sc81e. 
The most disturbing ~lement is the steep decline in prices for newly built vessels (see next paragraph) 
which has a significan\ impact on demand.  Ship owners react to historically low prices by placing orders 
that can be considered a "bet on the future", i'.e. at higher prices some ships would be ordered only later or 
not at all.  lt can be expected that this type of  additional demand in recent years will be compensated by a 
significantly lower demand later which makes it difficult for shipyards to keep a balanced order book and 
a consistent level of  employment. 
The supply side of the market is still dominated by three major regions: South Korea, Japan and the EU 
which take a combined market share of some 80%.  This report therefore focuses on these regions and 
their most important shipbuilding products.  Niche markets and shipbuilding activities outside the  three 
main regions will not be addressed here. 
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Shipbuilding capacity in  Korea has grown from  around  1.7  Mio cgt in  1988  to 4.6 Mio cgt in  1997 
(+170%).  In the same period capacities in the EU have been reduced from 4.4 Mio cgt in 1988 to 3.1 
Mio cgt in  1997 (-29.5%). Capacities in the third major shipbuilding area, Japan, have remained stable 
at  5.6 Mio cgt. The increase on the supply side has mainly to be attributed to South Korean expansion 
since I 994. As Korea did not report figures on cgt capacities to OECD in the past, these figures were 
calculated from completed gross tonnes using varying conversion factors which reflect the evolution in 
the product mix of  Korean yards (see Annex lll). 
3 Priu Developmeatl 
As already mentioned  prices for new vessels have suffered severely as capacities were increased, and 
some competitors are desperate to attract orders to fill  these capacities. Specific cases in this regard will 
be. discussed in chap~r  3  .. lt is obvio~  that the ~line  in achi~vable prices is not ~mog~us:  di!ferent 
shiptypes  are  used  m  different  busmess  envlConments,  freJght  rates  (as  a  maJor  p~tcr  tor  the 
attainable  return on investment) depend  on the  commodities and  the  trading  areas in qUestion,  and 
shipowners show different attitudes depending on the  particular market.  The table  below gives some 
indications on the decline in prices for some selected shiptypes which can be co&tsidered as representative 
for the bulk of new merchant ships. The prices are calculated averages, derived from  av~ill;lble contract 
intormation. Prices have gone down across the board and have now reached a level that in many cases do 
not allow shipyards to cover operating costs. 
Table 1 
Evolution ofprice~·  for newly built ships  'fn Millions of  US Dollar~~ 
-
1997  1998  March 1999 
Panama~  Contailler Carrier  53.0  42.0  37.5 
1100 TEU Container Carrier  20.0  18.0  17.0 
Very Large Crude Oil Carrier (VLCC)  83.0  72.5  69.5 
Ca_pesize Bulk Carrier  40.5  33.0  31.5 
Panamas Bulk Carrier  27.0  20.0  18.5 
Tweendecker 1  ~.000 dwt  165  14.0  13.5 
Source: Clarkson World Shipyard Monitor. 
1997  and  1998 prices are the average of reponed prices  in  th~:  resp~:ctivt: years.  l·or  1999.  prices  art:  the  average  reponed 
prices during the first quarter of  !hal year. 
Table 2 
Evolution of  prices/or newly built ships (annual changes in percent) 
1997/1998  1998/1999  1997 /March 1999 
Panama~  Container Carrier  -20.75%  -10.71%  -29.25% 
1100 TEU Container Carrier  -10.00%  -5.56%  -15.00% 
Very Large Crude Oil Carrier (VLCC)  -12.65%  -4.14%  -16.27% 
Ca_pesize Bulk Carrier  -18.52%  -4.55%  -22.22% 
Panamax Bulk Carrier  -25.93%  -7.50%  -31.48% 
Tweenduker l  ~.ooo dwt  -15.15%  -3.57%  -18.18% 
--------- --
The biggest price  decreases  are  rel:orded  with  J>ana.m.ax  bulk  carriers and  Panam.ax  container vessels. 
Both  types of ships  are  very  important  to  the  Korean  shipbuilding  industry  in  general  and  to  some 
investigat.l!d yards in particular. This report will try to  indicate the extent to whid1 lhese market segments 
have hcen targetl!d  by  Korean competit0rs and how this has atlected prices (and consequently created an 
"artiticial demand"). 
It should be  noted dmt this significant decline in prices, atlecting all major shiptypes, not only threatens 
the protitability of shipyards, it also poses problems to the shipping community as tonnage ordered before 
d1e  price decline needs to  be reassessed  in  its asset value.  With a  lower asset value creditor:; ask for 
additiOJml  collateral  coverage,  thereby  incr~:asing fm.ancing  costs and  cutting  ir.to  the profts of ship 
owners. 
4 1\ofarUt Sbara 
As a oonsequence of  the fierce oompetition in the shipbuilding mru'k.et and the dramatically lower prices, 
market shares have shifted. Figure J  shows the breakdown of  market shares b)' countries and regions fur 
the period  1997  t.o  the first half of 1999.  It can be argued  that this period was exceptional fur  various 
reasons,  however,  it would  be  beyond  the  scope of this  report  to  analyse  the ~t  ~vements in a 
larger  timeframe.  A  wider  perspective  would  also  not  change  the  overall  pictur~ qf a  market  in 
difficulties.  l  / 
Fig.  J 
World market shares by counJrylregion (new orders, based on cgl),  /997,  /998 and I  ~·t half  of  /999 
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The significant  increase of EU  market share  in new orders in  1998  was due  to the Asian crisis and  the 
tinancing  problems  that  came  with  it  and  cannot  be  considered  as  part  of a larger  trend.  There  were 
almost no orders awarded to South Korean shipyards in the first half of 1998 as owners took a "wait and 
see"  position and  banks  were  unable  to provide  financing.  This makes  the recovery of Korean market 
share in the sewnd half of 1998 even more remarkable.  As can be seen, Korean market share is on the 
rise again after the specific financing problems and economic uncertainties in 1998 were overcome. South 
Korea  has now  its largest market share ever and has also overtaken Japan (a declared objective of the 
Korean goverrunent and industry). China has also managed to increase market share which is reflected in 
the  increase of "others".  The  USA  plays a minor role  in  world  shipbuilding,  but  various  protectionist 
elements (Chapter XI, Jones Act, navy orders) assure that US yards are able to stay in business and could, 
6 under  certain  conditions,  come  back  into  commercial  shipbuilding  in  the  future.  lnfonnation  on 
completed tonnage shows a similar structure; the relevant data can be found in the annexes. 
Japan which until now has been able to "buffer'' the negative market trend through domestic demand, has 
seen a decline of  some 200/o in new orders in the first six months of 1999. As a result yards have started to 
reorganise and  there  is  persistent  talk  of consolidating  the seven  major Japanese  shipyards  into  four 
groups. The EU's market share decreased in the  first half of I 999 which is  in  line with the  longer term 
trend.  EU  shipyards are coming under increasing  pressure  which  is  also  reflected  in  the  fact  that the 
British-Norwegian Kv~emer  Group (Europa's largest shipbuilding group) decided in early  I  999 to sell all 
its  shipbuilding operations, claiming that the  return  from  shipbuilding operations was  too  low to  keep 
them attractive to  Kv~emer's investors and  shareholders.  Moreover two  shipyards in  Europe have  been 
closed or are  about to  close (Aarhus Flydedok in  Denmark and  Les  Ateliers et  Chantiers du  Havre  in 
France, respectively). 
Market Composition 
Figure Lf  provides  a  snapshot  of the  distribution  of ship  types  ordered  in  I 998.  The  largest  market 
segments are  those  for  crude oil  tankers,  bulk  carriers,  product/chemical  carriers,  general  cargo ships, 
container vessels and passenger ships.  EU  yards  which  have  basically ceased to  produce ships in  the 
large volume market segments of crude oil carriers, bulk carriers and general cargo ships are now also 
facing  increasing competition in  the  segments of product/chemical  carriers,  ferries  and  full  container 
ships.  Only passenger ships and some types of ferries remain areas in  which Europe dominates because 
EU yards are technological leaders and therefore still attract the majority of  orders. ll should, however, be 
noted  that  a  major  EU  cruise  operator  has  recently  awarded  two  important  contracts  to  a  Japanese 
shipyard which could  ultimately endanger the  dominant market  position that  EU  yards still enjoy.  EU 
yards  have  continuously  lost  nw·ket  shares  to  Asian  ~ompetitors  even  in  segments  which  they 
·traditionally dominated, despite major efforts to i1movate and to raise productivity. 
Fig 4 
World mark£! shares by shiptype (order.\·,  hased on c~f). 1  iJI.)X 
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6 The Container Shlpi Segment 
In tenns <>f cgt, container vessels  repr~sented the  Ia: gest market segment in  1998. Container ships have 
been a major product of Japanese and EU yards in lhe paDt and  they are lhe "backbone" of world Hnei 
shipping. European yards have had a particular expertise in very large container ships (Post·Panam.ax), as 
these vessels are technologically demanding ar.d follow different and more complex design pf!radigms. 
As  Korean competitors are obviously targeting the  whole container ship rn.arket  segment, this merits a 
closer look.  Figure 5 shows the development in market shares for Japan, South Korea and the EU and the 
overall order volume in 1997, 1998 and the 1st half of 1999. 
Fig.  5 
Development of  mark£/ shares for Japan,  South  K.or~ta and the EU in cor.tafner vessels (order.\·,  based on 
cgt).  1997 to the first half  of  1999 
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Korean  yards  have  made  very  signi ticant  inroad::.  into  the  market  for  container  vessels  since  1997. 
Although the statistics indicate that Korean yards have expanded rr  .arket share at  the e><pensc: of Japanese 
and other non-EU competitors, EU shipyards have clearly  faile<i  to pmticipate ir1  the  1998 order boom on 
the same scale as  Korea, and seem bound to concentrate on maintaining their comparatively low market 
share of ca.  15%  whereas the  Korean  share has now reached  nearly 70% in  terms of cgt.  It should be 
noted that overall orders (world total in cgt) tor container vessels increased by 30% from  1997 (2.43 Mio. 
cgt) to  1998 (3 .16 Mio. cgt) and stood at 1.12 Mio. cgt for the tirst half of 1999. 
There is  concern that the developments in  the market for  container vessels c.ould  be repeated for terries 
and cruise vessels.  Asian competitors have a track record of attracting orders for  sophisticated tormage 
through extremely low prices, hoping that they will  improve their technical abilities in  the course of the 
project and gain the reputation that is needed to attract more orders.  In the case of the two cruise vessels 
ordered in  Japan, there are  clear statements from  the  building yard that  the order does not  have  to  be 
protitable as long as the yard is able to deliver lhe quality that the market demands, thus putting the yard 
on the map of cruise operators.  The investigated ferry order at Samsung (see chapter 3) seems to follow 
the same business strategy. 
7 CoodutioDJ for Cbapter l 
•  Overcapacities in the shipbuilding market exist and are  very  likely to grow due  to both decrea.iing 
demand and increasing supply. 
•  South Korean capacity expansion. especially in the period 1994 to 1996, has been the main reason for 
the  continuing  and  growing  imbalance,  and  Korean  yards  have  great  difficulties  in attracting  a 
sufficient number of  orders to cover costs.  , 
•  Prices  have  plummeted  in  particular  for  ship  types  for  which  Korea  competes,  brfoging  demand 
forward  and shifting market shares  to  Korean  yards.  Most significant is the shift in nlarket shares 
with regard to container vessels where Korea is probably nearing a dominant position.  China which is 
seen by many as a future shipbuilding power has aJso increased market share in the period covered by 
this report. 
8 3.  Detailed Market Mooltorin& aad Aoaly•ls 
Nature of 1blpbuUdiDg eootraetl 
Merchant ships are capital goods with some distinctive features  that  make  it  difficult for  outsiders  to 
analyse their  true b"ilding costs.  A precise calculation very  much depends on infonnation about the 
particular building p~oject and the yard facilities used, both of  which are normally kept confidential. 
;  ) 
•  Ships are very .large technical objects, typically consisting of a steel hull and steel deckhouse and a 
great number o( technical sub-systems and outfitting items. 
•  Ships  are  rarety  produced  in  large  series  and  their  design  is  therefore  not  uniform.  Various 
materials from  il great  nwnber of suppliers are  used  in  the construction of ships  which  requires 
close co-operation  between  yards  and  suppliers.  As  production  is  often  "one-off'. the  specific 
conditions of the  building yard  play  a significant role  with  regard  to costs, quality  and  delivery 
schedule. 
•  Typically  shipowners  are  single entrepreneurs  or  are  represented  by  a  small  group  of people. 
Orders are placed with one yard per project, giving a combination of large order volumes :md rather 
close and intimate business relations that are rarely transparent to the public.  It should, however, 
be  noted  that the  shipping  industry  is  undergoing  a  concentration  process  that  will  also  affect 
shipbuilding through a demand for larger series and standardised designs. 
•  The  shipbuilding market for  merchant ships  is  a global one.  European  shipowners in  particular 
place orders around the world, reacting to advantageous conditions and exploiting the differences in 
prices  and  financing  conditions.  Korean  and  Japanese  owners,  however,  traditionally  tend  to 
source with domestic yards, giving them a certain amount of  demand they can rely on. 
•  Shipowners often have preferences for  the procurement of certain equipment items, depending on 
previous experience and the composition and training of their crews.  Shipyards on the other hand 
prefer to have a limited set of suppliers to achieve a high productivity and smooth production flow. 
These diverging interests often result in  detailed  negotiations on  the  composition of makers' lists 
which also affect prices. 
•  It takes a significant amount of time to construct a ship.  Shipowners who have to  react to  the  fast 
changing  demands of the  freight  market  and  the  global  t.!conomy  therefore  prefer  to  have  the 
shortest delivery time possible and are willing to  pay a premium.  Shipyards that are able to deliver 
swiftly and reliably can therefore afford to charge higher prices.  · 
•  Another important set of players in  shipbuilding projects are the classification societies which are 
in charge of the  technical approval of design and construction.  For certain sophisticated tonnage 
using non-standard design features,  details are  subject to  discussions between yard, classification 
society and owner.  This can result in higher or lower costs, depending on the particular project. 
•  The  financing  of ship  construction  differs  from  the  financing  of other  large  scale  engineering 
projects.  Financing costs can have  important implications for  individual  projects and  the overall 
price.  Financing schemes range from "front end payment" to "tail end payment".  In the first case a 
significant down-payment is made by  the buyer, resulting in  financial gains for  the  shipyard from 
interest.  In  the latter case the shipyard has to finance a great part of the building costs, resulting in 
additional costs tor the particular project. 
These characteristics lead to a great nwnber of variables that need to be factored in when analysing the 
true production costs for individual vessels and prove (or disprove) allegations of  unfair pricing. 
9 Study on SbipbuHdlng Market Monitoring 
ln order to collect the necessary data, the European Commission has  recourse to independent, reliable 
consultants.  Their ongoing study covers the following elements: 
• 
• 
Definition of a COi;t  breakdown model, including all relevant eost components both of the direct ship 
production and the shipyard in general.  The model is based on cost elements coveting direct costs 
(ma~erials, labour, eq~ipment, etc.) and i_ndirect  ~sts (financing of the ship and ot_th~ production 
equipment, overhead, Insurance, etc.).  More deta1ls of the cost model can be found m Annex I. 
Criteria to evaluate whether damage is caused to  EU  yards due to  unfair practices on the part of 
competitors outside the EU.  Two elements are considered for the evaluation: injurib~ pricing and 
injury, and subsidies.  Concerning injurious pricing the contract price is compared~to.the price for 
a like vessel when sold to a buyer of the exporting country (this "normal value" should be based 
on the price paid or payable in the normal course of trade).  Concerning countervailable subsidies 
an analysis is made whether there appears to be any subsidy as defined in the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (e.g.  financial  contribution from  the government or any 
public  body  involving  either  a  direct  transfer  or  non-collection  of funds  otherwise  due,  or 
provision of  goods or services which would normally be borne by the company). 
The study covers shipyards in  Korea, Japan, China and Singapore and a  range of shiptypes (>5000 
gross tonnes), mainly: crude oil tankers, bulk and OBO carriers, product and chemical carriers, general 
cargo ships and  reefers,  containerships,  RO-RO  vessels,  gas carriers,  passenger ships  and off shore 
vessels.  A total of  33 ships contracts are to be analysed within the study. 
Orders for new ships are selected for analysis in co-operation with the European shipbuilding industry 
to  ensure  that  technical  data  from  comparable  projects  is  available  and  technical  and  economic 
assumptions can be kept to  a minimum.  Given the critical nature of such an investigation, parameters 
are to be kept on the "safe side" to assure that calculated minimum costs for particular projects cannot 
be challenged. 
Investigated orders 
To date nine orders for new ships have been awlysed, all awarded to South Korean yards.  The European 
Commission assured a balanced selection of  cases while taking into account the overall political objective 
of the exercise, the relative urgency of the matter and the availability of meaningful data for comparison. 
Investigations  may  be  extended  to  shipyards  in  other  Asian  countries  in  the  course  of the  study  if 
necessary.  The cases covered so far are: 
•  Cable layer (series of 13 ships), 9,280 cgt, to be  built at Hyundai Mipo yard 
•  3,400 TEU container ship (series of 5), 27,750 cgt, to be built at Samsung Heavy Industries 
•  Passenger Ro/Ro ferry (series of2), 25,200 cgt, to be built at Samsung Heavy Industries 
•  6,800 TEU container ship (series of2), 52,390 cgt, to be built at Hyundai Heavy Industries 
•  3,500  TEU  container ship  (series of 2),  28,500  cgt,  to  be  built  at  Halla  Engineering  and  Heavy 
Industries 
•  Panamax bulk carrier, 19,500 cgt, to be built at Halla Engineering and Heavy Industries 
•  Panamax bulk carrier, 22,600 est. to be built at Daedong Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. 
•  Product carrier, 19,074 cgt, to be built at Daedong Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. 
•  Very Large Crude Oil Carrier (VLCC), 47,100 cgt, to be built at Daewoo Heavy Industries 
Not all of  the selected projects are confirmed orders and in some cases the  financing is not yet in place, 
which could lead to higher or lower order prices, depending on the  particular situation.  The European 
Commission is, however, convinced that the  information enter~ into the analysis is at present the  best 
10 available and  that  the  selected shipbuilding projects  give a  fair  illustration of the abnormal  financial 
conditions at which orders have recently been taken by  Korean yards.  As the cost model is constantly 
refined and previous analyses are updated accordingly, a final assessment can only be provided in a later 
report.  However, as mentioned above, all  parameters are set conservatively and changes should only 
occur in the direction_ of  even greater differences between order price and normal building price.  Another 
factor of  uncertainty ~~ the actual order price.  Different sources often quote different prices and for larger 
series the individual order price might be !ower because of  (real or perceived) economies of  scale  In this 
context  it also  needs  to  be  mentioned  that  the  model  tries  to  reflect  the  actual  behaviour of Asian 
competitors, e.g. costs for currency hedging are not factored in for Korean shipyards as it is known that 
these precautions typically are not taken. 
The following tables summarises th,! findings so far: 
Table 3 
Comparison oforder prices and calculated construction prices for selected new ships 
Reported order price  Calculated building price  Loss/gain in percent of 
in Mio. US Dollars  in Mio. L'S Dollars  calculated building price 
Cable layer  37.3  45.4  -17.84% 
(Hyundai) 
Container ship 3.400 TEll  36  56.4  -36.17% 
(Sarnsung) 
Passenger Ro/Ro ferry  69.5  90.9  -23.54% 
(Sarnsung) 
Container ship 6.800 TEU  73.5  86.9  -15.42% 
(Hyundai) 
Container ship 3.500 TEU  38  52.3  -27.34% 
(Halla) 
Panamax bulk carrier  18.9  31.8  -40.56% 
(Halla) 
Panarnax bulk carrier  18.5  24.9  -25.70% 
(Daedong) 
·-·------- -------··-
Product carrier  21.5  24.9  -13.65% 
(Daedong) 
-------:-::--- --
VLCC  (J8  5  84.3  -18.74% 
(Daewoo) 
At  first sight tht: results presented in Table 3 seem to  indicate that all orders investigated are loss making. 
However,  it  may  be  considered  as  acceptable business practice that a  yard  renounct:s any  protit for  a 
specilic contract or accept to  build a ship at a small loss if this allows it  to  make a strategic foray  into a 
new market  st~gmt:nt, providt:d that this does not becl•me a pennanent policy and that the loss from one 
contract is covered through other profitable contracts.  Under these circumstances, and allowing a certain 
error  margin  lor the  cost model, a  reporlt!d contract price of up  to  I  0-13% lower than  the calculated 
"normal  price"  could  be  considered as  acceptable.  C.~nsequently one of the  investigated orders (the 
product carrier from Daedong) can be seen as in line with nonnal business practice.  The remaining eight 
orders  are,  however, clearly  loss-making,  with  losses  between  I 5 and 40% of the  calculated  nom1al 
building price.  Since Halla and Daedong are technically bankrupt and have been operating under court 
receivership since December 1997 and February 1997 respectively, further investigation is needed to find 
11 out why such orders are accepted and how the Joss is  accounted for.  The cases ot Halla, Daedong and 
Daewoo are discussed later in the report in Annex II. 
There are indications that Korean yards fix  vessel prices according t:>  the level the shipyard perceives 
the market will bear, rather than through a bottom-up estimate, and production and purchasing targets 
are set accordingly.  Reports indicate that Korean yards work backwards from the ship price to allocate 
the value to each item of supply.  Often initial bid prices by suppliers are ignored by Korean shipyards 
and a target price ifl  given.  This policy is acceded to  by Korean equipment suppliers, itTespective of 
the effect it may have on their own business.  One European equipment manufacturer questioned has 
undertaken significant research into his competitors in  Korea.  He  found  that his biggest competitor 
published a  loss of about 30% of turnover and that other Korean manufacturers were facing similar 
problems.  As equipment suppliers in South Korea are often part of  the same larger conglomerates, the 
so-called chaebols, as the shipyards, true costs for particular operations are difficult to establish. 
Impact on EU yards 
A negative impact on EU yards is assumed when the order is made at a price which does not cover costs 
and which is  low enough to kt:ep toe order out of reach of EU  yards.  This is  particularly true if the 
owner has traditionally placed orders with  EU  yruds.  However, even where  Asian competitors had 
signifi~.:ant market shares in the past (e.g. for container ships or bulk carriers) the depressive nature of 
this pricing policy will have a negative effect on the market in general and, on this basis, the price may 
be perceived to be injurious.  Whilst this contract may not take work directly from an EU  bu:tder there 
will  be  a  "trickle down"  effect  in  the  market  as  a  whole,  which  will  have  a  detrimental  effect on 
shipbuilding in the EU. 
All of the 9 orders investigated had an impact on EU yards.  The key elements for the investigated cases 
are as follows: 
•  The cable layer order at  Hyundai  tits into the portfolio of the yard which has  past experience with 
specialised tonnage, but the building of cable layers has so far been a European domain and the order 
is  the  first of this kind  for  Hyundai  Mipo yard.  The owner is  a  complete newcomer and has  not 
ordered any ships before. 
•  The 3400 TEU container ship order at  Samsung is  common practice tor this yard.  The owner has, 
however, had a very close relationship with  EU  yards in  the past, and this order is a major departure 
from past ordering practice. 
•  The passenger Ro/Ro ferry  order at Samsung marks a departure from  the traditional portfolio of the 
yard and tor the owner this is the first order placed outside Europe.  Ferries of this type and size have 
been a domain of EU  yards and  the  fact  that  Korean comretitors are targeting  this market s.!gment 
will  put significant pressure on EU shipbuilding. 
•  The 6800 TEU container ships ordered at  Hyundai  Heavy lndu!;tries  represent a class of high-tech 
products which are new to  Korean yards.  The: owner has in the past ordered vc:ssels of this size and 
specification in Europe (and Japan) and for this particular order a European yard competed but failed 
to attract the order as it could not match the price. 
•  The 3500 TEU container ship built at Halla represents a :>tandard product of this yard and the owner 
has placed all of  his container ship orders with Halla in  tht~ past.  However, the price is extremely low 
and Halla yard seems to benefit from financial advantages that are unavailable to EU competitors (see 
also Annex II). 
•  The Panamax bulk carrier order at Halla has the same characteristics as the previous case. 
12 •  The Panamax bulk carrier from Daedong bas an offer price that is below the operating costs and well 
below what should be regarded as an «..nomic price. 
•  The pro®ct tanker built 81  Daedong shows a smaller gap  between offer and norma! building price 
which  reflects  the  less  fierce  competition in  this  market  segment as compared to  Panamax  bulk 
carriers.  Nevertheless the price offered is well  below the calculated break even price of 23.7 Mio. 
USD (excluding a profit, but including overheads and debt serviciug). 
•  Given the extremely high debts of  the Daewoo shipyard (6.7 Bn USD), the calculation of  the costs for 
debt servicing has a severe impact on the nonnaJ building price as derived from the cost model.  The 
VLCC order at Daewoo has  to carry a calculated contribution to debt servicing of 16.0  Mio.  USD 
which makes the ofter underpriced.  Without debt servicing the ofier price would cover the total direct 
costs aud overheads. 
Soutb Korean fwaocial &eetor 
The conditions under which shipyards such as Halla or Daedong operate (for more details see also Annex 
11) merit a closer look to the South Korean banking system in general and to the way in which export and 
operational credits are awarded. 
The Korea Export/Import Insurance Corporation (KEJC) was established by the Government of South 
Korea witl1 the express purpose of  guaranteeing risks related to exports borne by all Korean companies. 
This role has been revised and KEJC now guarantees that buyers receive tl1eir advance payments back 
in  case a  company (in  this case a  shipyard) goes bankrupt  and  the  bank  that  has  given the  refund 
guarantee  also  fails  to  cover  tlle  payment.  This  basically  means  that  buyers  of Korean-projuced 
tonnage have tlleir payments guaranteed by tlle Korean State. 
The Export import Bank of Korea (KEXIM) which is  fully  owned by  the South Korean Covernment 
provides instruments to  exporters to boost South Korea's exports of capital goods such as ships.  Two 
subject matters are of relevance here: The "export financing  facility"  hands out loans to  shipbuilders 
during  tlldr  production  period,  before  t.he  ddivery  of the  ship.  The  "refund  guarantee  facility" 
guarantcxs tlle refund of dowu-payments when shipbuilding contracts an;:  not fulfilled. 
Under  western  European  markets  ~.:<,nditions  these  facilities  could  b~:  established  witll  interest  at 
LlBOR + 2 to  3 percent. depending on the shipyard's t.:rcditworthiness.  KEXlM provides the "export 
financing  facility"  with  interest  rate  a~  I.IBOR  plus  mark-up  2.66%  plus  risk  premium  starting at 
0.25% depending on 1J1e  shipyard':. creditworthiness and wllateral, and tlle "refund guarantee facility" 
with  guarantcx  wnunissions  starting  at  0.4%.  according  to  creditworthiness.  0iven  tlle  high 
indebtedness of the South Korean yards it  is dear that tlle  rates otlered by  the  K£XlM bank do not 
t.:over  the  risk  related to  these facilities.  1-"or some Halla contracts tlle costs of KEXIM guarantees are 
reported  to  be  I% of the  contract  pri~.:e  because of the  precarious  situation  of this  yard.  This  is 
considered very low 
As  lJ2%  olthe t•)tal  guarantees pmvided by  KEXIM were tor shipyards in the period of January to 
November  19lJM  the  provision  of export  guarantees  by  KEXJM  can,  at  least  for  tllis  period,  be 
wnsidercd a sector specitk operation.  Moreover, the fact  that the bank is state owned and that  the 
state has covered its losses by means of  capital injections can be assimilated to a sector specific state 
aid case. 
13 KEXIM bas also taken over refuOO  guarantees from weaker commercial banks.  This additional  risk is 
balanced du'ougb Y..EIC  in case of failw-e.  As a result, buyers of Korean-produced tonnage can reJy on 
risk coverage through the Korean government, even if non-KEXIM guarantees are used. 
Korea  Exchange  Bank,  the  main  creditor  of Halla,  is  owned  by  the  Bank  of Korea  (32.1 %), 
Commerzbank AG  (Germany's  third  largest  bank,  30.4%)  and private  investors  (37;5%).  Korea 
Exchange Bank has  received fresh capita! from  various investors, including Commerzbank AG  and 
KEXIM.  in addition the state-owned Bank of  Korea has made a direct investment of  700 BilJion Woo 
in KEXIM, to allow it continuing the provision of fmancial support to exporters and to raise its capital 
adequacy ratio.  KEXIM in tum invested in the Korea Exchange Bank (thus helping, at least indirectly, 
Halla).  Other Halla creditors are SeoulBank, Industrial Bank of  Korea and the Foreign Exchange Bank 
of Korea, all of which are at least partially under public interest.  SeouiBank, which was until recently 
95% state-owned, has been declared a non-viable lender by the Financial Supervisory Commission and 
is now entirely under state ..:ontrol.  Its bad loans have been transferred to Korea Asset Management 
Corporation, a state agency, and it remains to be seen if  the credits to Halla will be treated according to 
standard commercial terms. 
This closely knit network of  fmancial institutions and the continued government influence in the banking 
sector provides the ground for a possible non-market-oriented behaviour of the creditors vis a  vis the 
shipbuilding industry.  Folio  wing a Council request the  previous Commissioner for  Industrial  Affairs 
Martin Bangemann visited South Korea in  May  J  999 to discuss the issue with the  Korean Government 
and the shipbuilding industry.  In response to the Commissioner's oral and written inquiries, notably in 
relation to the possible use of  JMF Funds, the South Korean Government replied that such funds are only 
used to bolster currency reserves and noted that they do not follow up on the use of funds once they have 
been disbursed to commercial banks, even if these commercial banb are w1der public control. 
Given  the  particular  nature  of shipbuilding  contracts,  and  the  paramount  importance  of financing 
schemes, it seems crucial to gain more insight into the issue of the  tinancial  funding of South Korean 
shipyards. 
Conclusions for Chapter 3 
•  The shipbuilding market monitoring st11dy commissioned by  the European Conunission has provided 
first  tangible results (see above).  The cost model  employed is  stable and suited to analyse the  true 
costs of  shipbuilding in Korean yards (the only ones investigated so far). 
•  None  of the  nine  investigated  orders  tor  new  vessels  was  ckarly  protit  m.uking  and  there  are 
convincing indications that Korean yards otfer ships at  below cost price; in some cases prices do not 
even cover operational costs, let alone the  s~rvicing of  debts. 
•  Halla,  and  to  a  lesser extent  Daedong,  exhibit  business  behaviour  which  would  be  considered as 
wrncceptable  in  the  EU.  As  both  yards are  undo..!r  bankruptcy proceedings the  financial  context in 
which d1!:!sc  yards operate needs fwther in-depth scrutiny.  Of particular concern are past and current 
debt  forgiveness  and  debt  moratoria,  as  wdl  as  advantageous  interest  rates,  fresh  credits  and 
guarantees tor new ship construction projects. 
•  The  tinancial  system  in  Soud1  Korea,  as  fur  as  it  is  used  tor  the  financing  of shipyards  and 
shipbuilding projects, remains opaque and, as there is substantial scope tor government intervention 
wid1  large  parts  of the  banking  sector  being  owned  by  the  "tate,  interference  in  fmancial  and 
organisational matters could have occurred.  Credits and guar.:uuees given to shipyards do not follow 
global business practices, and such commerci..W aisk assessment as ha.~; been undertaken does not seem 
to follow d1e laws and logic of  a market economy. 
14 lheJe can be no doubt that the market for merchant ships is in cris1s.  Although thls industrial sector has 
seen  problems over a long  period of time, the situation is becoming irACreac;ingly  criticaJ  as  capacities 
continue to grow, competition from low-wage countries is getting stronger and prices are oo&e-<living. 
For certain Shiptypes, profits from shipbuilding pperations seem to be almost unachievable.  This pnx:ess 
has been d!am.aticaJly ~lerated  by the Asian crisis. 
At the onset of the crisis, Asian manufactur~rs did not enjoy an immediate  advantage from  cWTency 
devaluations.  Instead, the crisis deeply affected Asia's fUlWlcial  sector and made ship fmancing difticult. 
The emergency measures for the revitalisation of the Asian fmancial  markets have improved financing 
conditions,  leaving  Asian  yards  with  competitive  advantages  from  wage  cuts  and  devalued  local 
CWTencies. 
It should,  however,  be  recognised  that  Asian  shipyards,  in  particular  in  South  Korea,  .are  strong 
competitors in their own right.  Yard facilities are often state-of-the-art, the  work force  is  skilled and 
flexible and the product quality matches shipowners' demands.  Moreover the local supplier base is able 
to provide major equipment at significantly lower prices.  This, however, does not excuse unfair business 
practices and price offers that are below costs.  There are indications that injury to competing EU yards 
has indeed been caused to some extent and that Korean yards have received and may continue to receive 
support under non-market conditions from state controlled banks.  Tills gives rise to concerns regarding 
possible indirect state s•Jpport. 
Capacity  cuts  in the market are  necessary  in  order to  return  to  a  balanced  and  healthy  shipbuildir.g 
market.  OnJy then will prices recover to allow shipyards to operate profitably.  Unfortunately the OECD 
agreement has  not entered into force  and even  were  this  now to  be  achieved, capacities would not  be 
immediately affected as the agreement does not  address this issue.  Yolwllary capacity cuts by  Korean 
yards,  which are chiefly responsibk tor the  increase in  capacity, seem  to  be  similarly elusive as most 
companies are regarded as "too big to fuil"  and  from  past experience expect the government to bail out 
the industry.  The cases of Halla, Daewoo and Daedong indicate that further investigations on a potential 
indirect bail-out of  these yards are necessary. 
Looking at torecasts tor demand and capacity. a quick improvement in the situation cannot be expected. 
Answers  to  th'!  problem  theretore  need  to  be  given  under  various  timeframes,  with  more  in-depth 
investigations on the general market developments being performed in parallel: 
•  Damaging or non-market business practices, in particular on the part of Korean manutacturers, need 
to  be  stopped as quickly as possible.  It must be ensured that  the conditions and assumptions under 
which the JMF-led rescue package was given to Korea and to  which the Korean goverrunent agreed, 
are  fully  respected.  The IMF, in the contnt of the economic programme supported by the 
shtnd-b;-t arrangcm,·nt, can help w ensure tb1.t budgetary subsidies and other possible forms 
of go\lernmcnt support ne not given to a~.iling shipyards. Member States could instruct their 
Exccutin~ Directon w stres• this point at the IMF Boa~.rd.  The particular issues that need to be 
addressed  are:  the  degree  of state  control  in  each of the  major  creditors  of Korean  shipyards, 
especially in those who participated in the debt write-offs and/or moratoria; the question of whether 
the latter's actions are justified under market economy criteria; the question of whether the Korean 
govenunent's undertaking to the 1Mf not to bail out ailing companies has been fully respected in the 
cases of  Halla, Daewoo and Daedong. 
16 •  Trade remedies are an important lin.e of  action.  Traditional anti-dwnping or countervailing measw-es 
ace  not applicable to shipbuilding as ships ace  not imported and since the OECO agreement has not 
entered  into  force,  there are  no  direct  instruments  to  combat  injwious pricing.  However,  in  the 
multilateral disciplines section, the "Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measw-es" (ASCM) 
of the  WTO  (which  has  so  far  not  been  applied  to  the  shipbuilding  sector)  provides  a  dispute 
settlement mechanism that can be employed against subsidies granted by a WTO me~r  and causing 
adverse  effects  to  the  interests  of other  WTO  members.  The  ASCM  currently, esfahlishes  a 
presumption of serious prejudice  when  it  is  demonstrated  that  subsidies of 5%  ad  valorem,  or 
subsidies to  cover operating  losses  and  direct  forgiveness of debts exist.  Information  recently 
collected appears,  for  the  first  time,  to  contain some initial  indication  that  the  del?t  forgiveness 
arrangements from  which at least one Korean shipyard has  benefited might consti\ute a  subsidy 
within the definition of  the ASCM.  However, given the very strict conditions which have to be met 
under the Agreement, such intormation is clearly insufficient tor WTO action to be launched at this 
stage.  Jf elaborated and structured in the appropriate way, the information colleded could form 
tbe  basis  for  tbe  preparation and  lodging of a  Trade Barriers  Regulation  complaint  by 
industry.  Tbis would give rise to an eumlnation procedure during wbicb tbe Commission 
would  thoroughly  investigate  111U  factual  and  legal  aspects  of  the  prima  facie  evidence 
submitted and collect additional information to substantiate an action which would meet the WTO 
standards and would have a chance to  be  successful.  The appropriateness of resorting to a  WTO 
action  would  then  be  assessed  on  the  basis  of the  Commission's  investigation  report.  In  that 
context it is worth noting that Korea or any other WTO member could also challenge the EU  state 
aid  regime on  the  basis of the  multilateral  disciplines  section of the  ASCM,  provided  it  can  be 
established that adverse effects have occurred on the side of the complaining party. 
•  To support the above approach more information is  urgently required on the financial  structures and 
instruments employed in  Korea in general.  This includes the relationships between banks and other 
financiaJ  institutions active  in  shipbuilding,  the  principles  under  which  credits  and  guarantees are 
awarded, and the probability of debt repayments under nonnal  market conditions.  Tbe European 
Commission  tbrougb  its  continued  monitoring  efforts  will,  in  co-operation  with  industry, 
continue to examine allegations of 'lubsidisation through such acli\lities and present its findings 
to the Council. 
•  For  the  future  the  conclusion  of :diD  agreement  establishing a  le\lcl  playing field  in  the St:4!tor 
should be pursued.  It should  include as  many  players as  possible,  ::tt  least the  important and  the 
emerging shipbuilding countries, and cover aJI  important issues that need to  be addressed to establish 
a healthy shipbuilding environment in  tJ1e  long run.  Working Party 6 ofOECD, during its last session 
in  June  1999, agreed to  aim at  improved transparency in  the  sector by  intensifying work on supply 
and  demand  and  by  providing  governments  and  industry  with  information  and  analysis of the 
market conditions, espet:ially in  relation to the supply side.  This will encompass the production of 
common forecasts on supply and demand to  be updated annually, and the creation of a database on 
price!> of vessels.  In  add;tion to  the  transparency exercise on recent policy developments this will 
provide  a  lorum  to  exchang~' views  on capacity  and  potential  price  problems.  Member States 
should give maximum support to this approach.  Notwithstanding the clear dillicultics of  putting a 
glob<l.!  shipbuilding agreement in place in the near future, etlorts must continue in this direction. 
Maritime business is a global one by its very nature, and the shipbuilding market has become subject to 
globalisation earlier and to a greater extent tlum other capital goods markets.  The distortions resulting 
from  ditlerent ousiness cultures Wld  practices, including the level of state intervention and  the attitude 
towards such intervention, should not be accepted as an unavoidable side effect of  globalisation.  Rather 
these distortions need to  be  addressed proactively before the market balance is  fmally  and  irreversibly 
destroyed. 
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18 Amle1l 
DetaiJJ of eott model uHd 
The cost model employed fur the  shipbuilding market monitoring study (see chapter 3) distinguishes 
between the following items: 
•  Material  costs (steel, engine and  propulsion  system,  auxiliary engines, automation and  control 
equipment, cargo handling and cargo treatment equipment, specialised equipment, etc.); 
•  Labour  costs  (engineering,  administration,  management  and  production)  both  in-house  and 
concerning sub-contractors; 
•  Financing costs including guarantees, etc.; 
•  Other direct costs such as classification costs, risk insurance, warranty reserve, commissions, etc  .. 
The estimate of  material and equipment costs in the cost model is based on an estimate of  costs within 
the EU, and  applying a  variation factor which takes account of the fact  that material and equipment 
prices are lower for Asian competitors. This has been accomplished by  undertaking a survey of over 
I 00 equipment manufacturers within Europe who are competing against domestic suppliers in Asia for 
contracts in Asian yards. In each of the categories the prices offered by South Korean manufacturers to 
domestic buyers were found to be approximately 25% lower than  the equivalent price in the European 
industry. This competitive advantage is taken into consideration in the model. 
The analysis of wages is based on officially published statistics. Jn  the case of South Korea there has 
been much talk of wage cuts since the economic crisis. The cost model evaluates the actual extent of 
this fall  in  wages.  The conclusions drawn from ·this analysis are that whilst there was, as expected, a 
decrease in wages in  I 998 over I 997, following the economic difficulties, the decrease was fairly low 
and  was  certainly  lower than  press  reports of 50%  wage  cuts  (and  more)  have  suggested.  Jt  also 
appears from the statistics analysed that there has been little resolve to maintain lower wages, with the 
recovery in earnings heralded by the very large bonus payment at the end of I 998, following a year of 
restraint. Further analysis has been carried out to  take into account the etfect of  exchange rate changes 
on  the  level  of earnings expressed  in  US  Dollars.  Dollar equivalent  earnings  tell  by  almost  50% 
between October 1997 and February I 998 but have been rising since that time. Taking into account the 
average over the period February to December, dollar denominated earnings tell by 34% between I 997 
and 1998. The average for first quarter 1999 was around 20% below the same period in 1997. 
Asswnptions on total working hours are also base;:d on ofticial statistics, complemented with a specific 
adaptation of the  figures  to  the  shipbuilding  industry.  The same  approach  is  used  to  evaluate  the 
overall  productivity  of Asian  shipyards,  taking  industrial  productivity  in  general  as  a  basis  and 
adapting it to the specific situatioP of each yard under investigation. Productivity is expressed as man-
hours needed to produce one cgt at the facility in question. 
Direct  financing  costs included are  those for  the  working capital  t<>>  the contract and those  tor the 
repayment  guarantees.  The  contribution  iliat  each  order has  to  make  to  the  debt  servicing  of the 
building yard (if there are debts to  be servic.:d) is include,., under indirect costs. However, whe1e yards 
received debt forgiveness, these debts o.re no longer considered. 
For each selected order the items mentioned above are specified and complemented with asswnptions 
on  indirect costs such as overhead, yaru-specific amortisation of shipbuilding eqL,ipment and  profit 
margin.  It is obvious that many elements in the  cost model can only be  specified through in-depth 
knowledge of  the particular ship on order and the building yard. The analyses are continuously updated 
as soon as additional information becomes avaiLable. 
I  •  •  •  '  ' •i  .~ .  . 
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Detalb or lnvntipted tbipyardt 
A.  Cue or HaUa tbipyard 
Annes. II 
Shipbuildin~\operations at Halla were transferred from the original site in Inchon to  a purpose-built 
new facility in Mokpo, known as Samho, in 1996. The new Samho shipbuilding facility, operated by 
Halla Heavy, Engineering (HHE) boosted the capacity of  the=  shipyard by around four times, and Halla 
now ranks die 5th largest shipbuilder in the world. The average output from Samho in the three years 
since it became fully  operational (operations commenced in  1996) has been 430.546 cgt (including 
expected output in 1999). The output from Halla (including Inchon and Samho) in terms of  ~gt by year 
is illustrllted in the following chart. 
Fig.  6 
Development of  Halla's shipbuilding output (cgt),  I 990-/999 
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The boost in output following the hand-over from Inchon to Samho in  1996 is clearly visible from this 
chart. The yard has been troubled since its opening, suftering from  problems of design of the facility, 
and  from  its  location on  the  East  Coast of the  country,  away  from  the  main areas of shipbuilding 
employment at Ulsan and Susan. Soon after becoming operational it  was clear that the design of the 
yard was inadequate to achieve the steel throughput needed to meet the capacity target. The inadequate 
design of the facility  leads to  performance penalties which are further increased by the dated systems 
installed in  the  yard  to  support production.  Performance also  suffers  because of the  location of the 
shipyard. Higher wages than paid by other shipbuilders have had to be offered to attract workers to the 
region,  and  the  quality of workers employed  is  not  thought  to  be  as  high  as  found  in  other main 
shipyards in :.;outh Korea. 
ln December 1997, South Korea sustained one of its largest corporate failures with the collapse of the 
Halla Group_  Halla has since survived with intensive financial restructuring. This has included one of 
the  most  important  component  parts  of  the  group,  the  shipbuilding  subsidiary  HHE.  Despite 
bankruptcy the shipyard is still operating with the support of its creditors (with Korea Exchange Bank 
as  the  JlUlin  creditor).  Support has taken two  primary  forms,  debt forgiveness  and  bridging finance 
from the international fill8llCC markets. 
HHE has  been generating a  net loss in  1996,  1997  and  1998  (the  period after Inchon closed  and 
operations were moved to Samho). The  shipyard has  failed  to  make  even an operating profit.  The 
liCCOWUS indicate that Halla has  been pricing contracts at a level which does not cover direct cost of sales, let alone contribute tD  selling and  administrative expenses and  other costs, notably the cost of 
financing the new facility. The level of these operating losses is very high, at 17,5% of sales in  1997 
and  29,5% of sales in 1998.  This strongly suggests that  the  level of pricing was very  significantly 
below costs and that the company has a very fundamental problem in operational terms. 
Since December 1997 HHE has  been under court management, a form of  official receivership. It has 
continued to compete for~shipbuilding work in thti international markets. Various reported shipbuilding 
contracts at extremely low prices have aroused a  hostile reaction from competitors on the grounds that 
the  company  has  received  illegal  finance.  These  contract  prices  are  well  below  the  international 
average, and based on the trading history of the company there is a very  legitimate concern that the 
company may be continuing to  take orders at a loss-making level, in the  face of an  urgent need  for 
orders to utilise capacity from next year onwards. 
In November 1998, Halla announced that the creditors of HHE had agreed to  write-off up  to  52% of 
the  company's collateralised  debt  and  78% of unsecured  debt.  In  addition,  interest  charges  were 
waived  from  much of the  remaining  debt.  The debt  reduction  amounted  to  978  Billion  Won (742 
Million US  Dollars). The overall debt amounted to 3,6 Trillion Won at the time. Most of the financial 
creditors of HHE were major domestic banks in  South Korea who collectively had sourced funds on 
the international markets for economic stabilisation. 
The rescue package for HHE has caused considerable controversy not only because of the size of the 
funding  required,  but  also  because  many  of the  company's  debt  problems  originate  from  the 
construction cost of the new facilities in the early  1990s.  Further concern has been expressed on the 
continuation of KEXIM bank to offer guarantees to Halla which is in effect bankrupt, and which in a 
normal commercial sense would not be available. KEXJM argues that it charges a premium to take this 
into  account,  although  it  is  unlikely  that  a  company  such  as  I lalla  would  be  able  to  attract  such 
guarantees in'a purely commercial situation. 
Due to  the serious problems at Halla all efforts to  sell  the yard have so  tar tailed. Hyundai which was 
rumoured to be  interested in the yard has frequently denied this, but seems now to  have agreed to  take 
over Halla's management and send  ISO  top executives to help in the reorganisation of the yard. At the 
same time another debt moratorium has allegedly  been  agreed.  Given the  prominent roJe  that  state-
controlled banks play with regard to  Halla, providing tinam:t:  and  participating in  the debt write-offs 
and moratoria, these developments require further s<.:rutiny, as tar as possible government intervention 
is concerned. 
As the  cases of Daedong and  Daewoo show a similar patterns as Halla a  few  words need  to  be  said 
about these two shipyards. 
U.  Case of Uacdong Shipbuilding Co. 
Daedong  Shipbuilding  Co  Ltd  is  a  private  limited  company,  registered  in  South  Korea  in  1967. 
Daedong is  solely  involved in  shipbuilding. Its  main construction site moved trom Pusan to a  brand 
new shipyard at Chinhae, 40 miles down the coast from Pusan, in  1996. As of  February 1997, Daedong 
has  been  operating  under  a  court protection  plan.  Daedong  is  currently  trading  under a  corporate 
reorganisation  package approved  by  the  courts.  Between  February  and  October  1997  the company 
operated under the direction of a court-appointed receiver, who put together a  restructuring package 
which  aims to  enable Daedong to pay back creditors over an agreed period of time and  the yard to 
carry on trading. This plan was accepted by  the courts in October 1997, and permitted the company to 
continue operating in receivership. The company's main creditors finally approved the rescheduling of 
• 
u the debt in August 1998 (Daedong's total debts are ca. 204 Mio.  USD).  Under the reorganisation plan 
Daedong has agreed to repay its debts over a period of 14 years (1998-2012) at an interest rate of7% to 
8%, and it has been granted a moratorium on repayments until2003. Until then, the company will have 
to pay interest on its debts,  but will not be  required to repay any  of the principal.,  Although Korea 
emphasises that the rescue measures for Daedong were taken by  independent private creditors , it is at 
least questionable whether these measures are compatible with the market oriented practices Korea has 
committed itself to in the context of  the IMF reform programme. 
Daedong's original  shipyard  in  Pusan  specialised  in  the  construction  of chemica!  tankers,  product 
tankers and mini-bulkers up  to  10.000 tonnes deadweight. Daedong's new yard opened in June  1996, 
and the new capacity effectively replaced the existing capacity at the Pusan yard. 
Output from the two yards since 1990 is presented in the following graph. 
Fig.  7 
Development of  Daedong's shipbuilding output (cgt),  1990-1999 
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The boost in capacity following the opening of the new  yard  in  1997  is  clear from  this chart. Output 
has  increased  from  a steady  level  of around  50.000  cgt  per  annum  in  the  old  yard  to  in  excess of 
300.000 cgt on order for delivery in 2000. 
After all  the problems encountered during  1997  Daedong achieved relatively strong results in  1998. 
Sales were  increased by  32%, while direct costs were  better controlled and rose  les!;  steeply, to allow 
gross  pro tits  to  be  doubled.  The company's  1997  I 1998 balance sheet shows  that,  although  the  long-
term debt Lotal  was virtually doubled, the short-term debt was sharply reduced. It should be noted that 
Korean interest rates fluctuated greatly during the course of 1998 with a fall  in commercial paper rates 
from  23% in  the tirst quarter to 8% in the last quarter. These movements are likely to have contributed 
lA>  tht:  reduction  in  interest  charges  for  the  year.  However,  a  Daedong  management spokesman has 
indicated  that  when  the  banks  approved  the  debt  rescheduling  in  August  1998,  they  reduced  their 
interest  rates.  If this  is  the  case,  it  raises  the  question  why  banks  have  abandoned market-oriented 
lending practices. 
Ill C.  Cate of Daewoo Heavy lndu1tria 
The Daewoo Group is one of Korea's top 5 conglomerates or chaebol.  It is active in a wide range of 
business sectors,  including electronics, shipbuilding, automotive, construction,  trading  and  financial 
services. The group is headed by the publicly quoted Daewoo Corporation, which was formed in  1967 
by  its  current C~.  Mr  Kim  Woo..choong.  Apart  from  its  role  as  parent  company,  Daewoo 
Corporation manag~s 1the group's construction and trading activities.  ~  l 
\  ' 
As  part  of the  general  Korean  government  attempt  to  induce  a  reorganisation  of the  chaebols' 
businesses, Daewoo is currently in the midst of a major divestment programme aimed at selling 3 I of 
its 4 I group companies by  early  2000.  The chaebols seem to  be  responding  to  the  e~forced change 
with  varying  degrees  of enthusiasm  and  most  are  reluctant  to  sell  off  profitable  businesses. 
Nevertheless,  Daewoo's own  programme  has  been  given  a much  greater  urgency  as  it  has  become 
increasingly clear that  the  group  is  teetering on  the  edge of bankruptcy.  The  Korean  government  is 
acutely aware that it cannot afford a failure on this scale for the sake of the economy as a whole. The 
short-term debt was originally due for  repayment at  the end of July  but  it has  been  reported  that the 
bankers have agreed to  roll  over the  debt for  another six months.  The  new  funds  will  replace debts 
called in by creditors in the last couple of months. At the same time, the creditor banks will be able to 
dispose of the collateral in any  way they  see fit  if the group does not keep  to  its  restructuring targets. 
The Korean government has commissioned Arthur Andersen to oversee the restructuring in an attempt 
to show that the plan will be executed fairly. 
In  addition  to  the  group  reorganisation,  Daewoo  Heavy  Industries  (DI-H)  under  which  the  shipyard 
operates, is itself restructuring. It is reported that it is selling off various business units and real estate, 
and the sale of its car division to  Daewoo Motor was the key to it being able to  increase its net profits 
in  1998. DHI is regarded as fundamentally one of  the most protitable parts of  the group. DHI has in the 
meantime come  under control  of local  banks,  but  the-question of' collatt:rals  is  still  being discussed. 
The shipbuilding division of DHI  operates two shipyards:  the Okpo Shipyard in  South Korea and  th~ 
Mangalia Shipyard in Romania. The Okpo yard is active,: not only in shipbuilding but also in repair and 
conversion, and production of  offshore platforms, drilling rigs and industrial plants. The Mangalia yard 
specialises in repairs and conversions. Output since 1990 is presented in the following chart.  -
Fig.  H 
Development ofDH!'s shipbuilding olllput (cgl),  IYCJO-/I)C)C) 
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The latest accounts of DHI to be published are for the year ended 31  December 1998. Whilst improved 
pre-tax  and  net  profits  might suggest a steady  improvement in  the  company's performance during 
IV 1998, a closer inspection reveals that this is too simplistic an interpretation. Despite an II% climb in 
sales, this was outstripped by the increases in both direct sales costs and overhead costs, resulting in a 
decrease in profits at gross and operating levels. 
There is little hard information available regarding DHI's specific debt repayment plans. As stated, the 
COlilpany's gearing at the end of 1998 can be considered quite healthy when compared with the current 
average for Korean shipyards. Nevertheless, much of the Daewoo group's future appears uncertain at 
present and there are disturbing reports that the Financial Supervisory Commission of South Korea has 
decided  to  soften  the  rules  for  Daewoo's domestic  creditor banks,  basically  exempting  them  from 
domestic  regulations  governing  lending  practices  and  allowing  them  to  add  non-pc::rforrning  loans 
during Daewoo's restructuring process. 
Data for Fig. 1: Completed ships 1985-1998, supply and demand forecasts by 
A  WES/SAJ and KSA, in Mio. cgt 
Year  1986  1986  1987  1988 
Completed ships 1985-1998  14,20  12,10  9,20  8,50 
Demand forecast AWES/SAJ 1999-2010 
Demand forecast KSA 2001-2006 
Supply forecast AWES/SAJ 2000-2005 
Supply forecast KSA 2000"2006 
Year (cont.)  1991  1992  1993  1994 
Completed ship• 1986-1998  11,40  12,10  12,40  12,50 
Demand forecast AWES/SAJ 1999-2010 
Demand forecast KSA 2001-2005 
Supply forecast AWES/SAJ 2000-2005 
Supply forecast KSA 2000-2006  -
Year (cont)  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Completed shlps1986-1998  16,90  18,00 
Demand forecast AWES/SAJ 1999-2010  15,60  15,60 
Demand forecast KSA 2001-2006* 
Supply forecaat AWES/SAJ 2000-2005  21,14 
Supply forecast KSA 2000-2006*  16,79 
Year (cont)  2003  2004  2006  2006 
Completed ahlpa 1986-1998 
Demand forecaat AWES/SAJ 1999-2010  15,60  15,60  16,49  17,38 
Demand forecaat KSA 2001-2006*  16,80  16,80  16,80 
Supply forecast AWES/SAJ 2000-2006  22,69  23,21  23,73 
Supply forecast KSA 2000-2006*  17,68  17,98  18,27 
Year (cont.)  2009  2010 
Completed shipa 1986-1998 
Demand forecaat AWES/SAJ 1999·2010  17,38  1?,38 
Dem&nd forecaat KSA 2001-2005 
Supply forecast AWES/SAJ 2000-200& 
Supply forecaat KIA 2000-2005 
Annex Ill 
1989  1990 
9,30  11,50 
1996  1996 
14,40  16,70 
2001  2002 
15,60  15,60 
16,80  16,80 
21,66  22,18 
17,08  17,38 
2007  2008 
17,38  17,38 
• Due to lack of  cgt data the KSA forecasts were re-calculated from completed gross tonnes applying a conversion factor. 
(I gt = 1,6 cgt) 
Source: OECD Bnd European Commlslilon 
v Data for Ffl. 2: CoutruetioD eapaeitiet iD JapaD, Korea aDd the EU, egt * tO" 
Year  1888  1888  1880  1881  1882  1883  1984  1886  1888  1887 
EU  4400  3684  3783  3311  3489  3264  3285  3168  3168  3168 
JAPAN  5600  5600  5600  5600  5600  5600  5600  5600  5600  5600 
8. KOREA**  1671  1633  1821  1841  2648  2437  2270  3619  4307  4648 
• • Due to lack of  cgt data lhc figures for Soulh Korea were calculated from completed gross tonnes, using OECD data 
and applying convcnion factonlhal reflect lhe evolution in lhc product mix of Korean yards. 
(1988-1991:  I gt'"l,9cgt; 1992-1994: I gt'"l,8cgt; 1995-1997:  I gt= 1,7cgt) 
Source:  OECD, Lloyd's Register of  Shipping and European Commission 
N.B.: Figures are based on national statistics using partly different defmitions. Data for Fig. 3: World market shares by coun1try/region, 1997, 1998 and 1st balf of 1999, 
cgt and percent, orders 
1997  1998  1. half 1999 
cgt*10,  share In%  cgt*103  share In%  cgt*10
3 
EU  2950,4  14,09%  4513,3  24,58%  1346,3 
REST OF AWES :  473,1  2,26%  725,7  3,95%  3~,5 
JAPAN  7930,4  37,88%  5741,8  31,28%  z  248,5 
SOUTH KOREA  6115,9  29,21%  4486,8  24,44%  227,2,4 
USA  331,4  1,58%  345,6  1,88%  324,3 
OTHER  3133,8  14,97%  2545,8  13,87%  1356,2 
GRAND TOTAL  20935,0  100,00%  18359,0  100,00%  7860,2 
Source: Lloyd's Register of  Shipping and European Commission 
share In% 
17,13% 
4,23% 
28,35% 
28,91% 
4,13% 
17,25% 
100,00% 
Additionml data: World market sbar~  by country/region, 1997, 1998 and lst half of 1999, 
cgt and percent, completed 
1997  1998 
cgt*10~  share In%  cgt*10~  share In% 
EU  3246,4  19,09%  3585,7  19,92% 
REST OF AWES  784,2  4,61%  881,4  4,90% 
JAPAN  6294,9  37,01%  6834,4  37,96% 
SOUTH KOREA  4053,3  23,83%  3656,2  20,31% 
USA  129,0  0,76%  360,4  2,00% 
OTHER  2501,5  14,71%  2686,0  14,92% 
GRANO TOTAL  17009,3  100,00%  18004,1  100,00% 
Source: Lloyd's Regi~ter of  Shipping and European Commiss1o11 
Data for Fig. 4: World market shares by shiptypc, 1998, cgt and percent 
(orders) 
----cgt*103  share in% 
CRUDE OIL TANKERS  ---- 2688,7  14,65% 
PRODUCT AND CHEMICAL CARRIERS  1646,7  8,97% 
BULK CARRIERS  2548,3  13,88% 
GENERAL CARGO SHIPS  1969,9  10,73% 
FULL CONTAINEFt HIGH SPEED LINER  3163,4  17,23% 
Ro-Ro VESSELS  441,4  2,40% 
CAR CARRIERS  780,2  4,25% 
GAS CARRIERS  637,8  3,47% 
FERRIES  553,2  3,01% 
-·· 
PASSENGER SHIPS  1632,2  8,89% 
FISHING VESSELS  336,2  1,83% 
OTHER NON CARGO VESSELS  1692,7  9,22% 
OTHER VESSELS  268,3  1,46% 
GRAND TOTAL  18359  100,00% 
~--
Source: Lloyd's Register of  Shipping and European Commission 
1. half 1999 
cgt*10~  share In% 
1345,2  15,18% 
365,6  4,13% 
3363,3  37,96% 
2426,9  27,39% 
157,3  1,78% 
1202,9  13,57% 
8861,2  100,00% 
2 
2£ Data for Fig. 5: Market tbua  of  Japaa, South Korea aad tbe EU iJJ cootaiJJer ves~els 
(orden, bated on qt), 1  'W7, 1998 and first IWI  of 1999 
1997  1998  1et half of 1999 
legt"'10'  •hare in% lcgt"'103  •hare in% lcgt"'103 •hare in% 
EU  681,8  23,92%  485,2  15,34%  164,0  14,63% 
SOUTH KOREA  368,3  15,14%  1395,1  44,10%  765,1  68,25% 
JAPAN  1085,2  44,62%  672,7  i  21,27%  99,0  8,83% 
OTHERS  397,0  16,32%  610,4'  19,29%  92,9  8,29% 
WORLD TOTAL  2432,3  100%  3163,4  .  100%  1121,0  100% 
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